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Abstract. Relationship-based access control (ReBAC) models define
authorization policies and make authorization decisions on the basis of
relationships between the entities in a system. We present a framework
through which multiple ReBAC model instances can interoperate so that
requests initiated in one system may target resources in a second sys-
tem. Further, our framework is able to support requests passing through
a chain of inter-connected systems, thus enabling many systems to be
connected together or a single large system to be decomposed into nu-
merous component subsystems. Whilst the underlying principles of this
framework can be applied to any ReBAC model, we introduce its for-
mal application to our RPPM model [3], the first, and most actively
developing, general computing ReBAC model.
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1 Introduction
Access control is a fundamental security service, employed within a system
to manage the interaction between (user) processes and (system-protected) re-
sources. Historically, access control in general-purpose computing systems has
used discretionary and role-based access control (RBAC) models. Recent work
on relationship-based access control (ReBAC), inspired originally by social net-
works [1, 2, 6], has shown that alternatives are viable for both specialist and
general computing applications [4, 5, 8]. In ReBAC, the specification and evalu-
ation of authorization policies is based on the relationships which exist between
entities of a system. The use of paths of relationships has several advantages over
roles, not least because they can naturally reflect the more complex, context-
specific nature of human interaction which otherwise requires the use of many,
highly parameterized, roles [3].
Whilst the consideration of paths of relationships is key to request evalu-
ation in any ReBAC model, different models support varying capabilities and
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constructs for representing and processing these relationships. However, the re-
lationships between entities in the modelled system are, intuitively, always rep-
resented as an edge-labelled graph. Such system graphs indicate the scope of
a model instance; the system’s entities (vertices in the graph), relationships
(labelled edges), and policies are bounded by the graph and the system’s au-
thorization requests are evaluated within it. Whilst a system is modelled by a
single ReBAC model instance (and therefore by a single graph), there are several
motivating situations in which multiple model instances may need to interact.
Firstly, systems are frequently connected together in order to support a wider
range of services. In such cases, a subject in one system may request to perform
an action on an object in a remote system. Currently such requests cannot
be supported in ReBAC models unless a single “super-graph”1 model captures
every entity and relationship within the two, and all intermediary, systems. This
requires global policies, outside of the “authority” of any one component system,
putting at risk the autonomy of all. The inter-connection of discrete autonomous
subgraphs is, therefore, desirable. Secondly, ReBAC models containing very large
system graphs (stand-alone, or super-graph as just discussed) will be impacted
by the fact that request evaluation in such models has a time complexity linked to
the number of nodes in the graph, whether they are relevant to the request being
evaluated or not. It is, therefore, desirable to decompose such very large system
graphs into smaller discrete autonomous subgraphs. Whilst request evaluation
complexity in each of these subgraphs will still be linked to the number of nodes,
the practical complexity is expected to be greatly reduced as many requests will
only involve a subset of subgraphs (assuming appropriate routing is available).
We, therefore, develop a framework by which two ReBAC system graphs
may be connected and requests initiated in one may be authorized in the other.
We introduce a formal application of this framework in RPPM, as we believe
RPPM is naturally suited to this task. It supports the modelling of general
computing environments, to which inter-operation is highly relevant. Further,
its two step request evaluation process and use of security principals provide a
natural “break point” at which a request may be transferred from one system
to another (particularly when employing graph-based policies). RPPM provides
a convenient basis for combining paths from multiple graphs without searching
end-to-end across the, potentially numerous, inter-connected system graphs.
Due to space limitations we do not provide a review of the operation of
stand-alone RPPM instances; this background can be found in [3, 4]. Section 2
introduces the Inter-RPPM framework as a specific example of our ReBAC inter-
operation approach. Section 3 describes its request evaluation process. In Sec-
tion 4 we discuss related work and in Section 5 we draw conclusions. The Ap-
pendix contains pseudocode for three algorithms required to support Section 3.
1 We use the term super-graph to identify a large system graph which models multiple
systems which might otherwise be modelled by distinct stand-alone system graphs.
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2 Inter-RPPM
The goal of our inter-operation framework is to connect distinct and autonomous
system graphs in such a way that we are not required to define and evaluate
relationship paths traversing a single super-graph. We, therefore, introduce an
inter-operation framework which maintains the autonomy of individual system
graphs by preserving their individual request evaluation scopes, system models
and policies. In order to provide connectivity between system graphs, a construct
external to the system graphs is required. We, therefore, introduce the concept
of a bridged system group and employ bridging relationships2, called bridges,
between hub entities within distinct component system graphs. A request to
access a remote resource will need to be evaluated by a sequence of RPPM
systems. Bridges provide the link through which we propagate information about
the outcome of each system’s “local” request evaluation to the next system in
the sequence; where it subsequently informs another local evaluation.
We employ a hierarchical dot notation to label elements: that is G.v and G′.v
represent different nodes (with the same label v) when G and G′ are distinct
system graphs.3 When all of the elements of a tuple, such as (v, v′, r), belong to
the same system graph G, we will write G.(v, v′, r) to simplify notation.
Definition 1. Let G = {G1 = (V1, E1), . . . , Gn = (Vn, En)} be a set of system
graphs. A bridge is an edge of the form (Gi.v,Gj .v, bridge-to) such that Gi 6= Gj.
A bridged system group is a pair (G, β), where β is a set of bridges.
Informally, a bridged system group comprises two or more RPPM model
instances whose system graphs are connected by one or more bridges. Each bridge
connects two hub entities; one each from two distinct component system graphs.
We illustrate this framework with a simple example which we construct from
two, initially disconnected, model instances, identified by their system graphs
G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2), shown schematically in Figure 1a.
In Figure 1b we illustrate the inter-connection of G1 and G2 through the
bridge (G1.h,G2.h
′, bridge-to) and develop the example further in Figure 1c to
incorporate three system graphs inter-connected via six bridges.4 Bridges are
directed – (G1.h
′, G3.h
′, bridge-to) connects G1.h
′ to G3.h
′, but not vice versa
– and are represented by an arrow. However, there may also exist a bridge
(G3.h
′, G1.h
′, bridge-to) in which case we will use a double-headed arrow to rep-
resent the pair of bridges between G1.h
′ and G3.h
′.
Any bridged system group defines inter-system paths, obtained by traversing
the bridges. A system graph sequence defines the sequence of system graphs along
2 We require an extra-model administrator to be responsible for the management of
these bridging relationships.
3 Where there is no ambiguity through context or element naming we continue to
leave out the prefix for convenience and clarity. So we do not prefix V1 and E1 in
G1 = (V1, E1), for example.
4 Note that the example of Figure 1c could equally represent three distinct system
graphs which have been connected together, or a large stand-alone system graph
which has been decomposed into three subsystems.
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(c) Bridged system group (1,2,3)
Fig. 1: Bridged system group examples
such a path, where no system graph may be repeated and the directionality of
the bridging relationships constrain the sequence. System graph sequences are a
key component of the request evaluation process as they identify a path from the
system originating a request to the system graph containing the target object.
Multiple such paths may exist; we require that the access control policy decision
point (PDP) within a system be able to determine the single, least cost path.
To achieve this we require that an extra-model administrator assign costs to
bridges, and that hub entities maintain and exchange system path information
using a modified path-vector routing protocol. Each hub communicates with
adjacent hubs to which it directs a bridging relationship, retrieving the cost
of their total (least) cost path to every other hub, and therefore every other
system graph, in the bridged system group (where an infinite cost indicates an
unreachable hub).5 Upon receiving these path costs the hub adds to each the
cost of the bridge connecting it to that neighbour; it will then update its local
system path table to reflect the least cost path (if it didn’t already know it) to
every remote hub, along with which adjacent hub each least cost path passes via.
A system’s PDP can collate this information from each of its local hub entities
in order to determine the single, least cost path to a target system graph, or to
determine that no such path exists. Henceforth, when identifying a system graph
sequence between two system graphs we assume the least cost such sequence.
3 Request Evaluation in Inter-RPPM
The basic RPPM model evaluates local requests within a stand-alone system
graph using two steps: compute principals (where principal-matching rules are
evaluated to determine whether security principals match to the request) and
compute authorizations (where authorization rules are evaluated to determine if
the matched security principals are authorized to perform the requested action).
5 The directionality of bridges is enforced by hub entities not exchanging system path
information against the direction of an incident bridge.
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Within Inter-RPPM, remote requests are made by a subject G.s to perform a
remote action G′.a (where G 6= G′) on a remote object G′.v. To support these re-
mote actions we introduce an originating remote request (ORR) and an incoming
remote request (IRR).6 The ORR represents the remote request as it is specified
within the originating system graph. The IRR contains additional data which
enable subsequent system graphs to contribute to the evaluation. When process-
ing remote requests, every traversed system graphs’ PDP employs the compute
principals step (whether evaluating an ORR or IRR), but only the target sys-
tem graph’s PDP computes authorizations. Essentially, non-originating system
graphs re-compute the set of matched principals based on the set computed by
the preceding system graph and identified in the IRR.
A policy graph is used during the compute principals step to order the eval-
uation of principal-matching rules and to enable principals to be “activated”
when specific other principals are matched to a request.
Definition 2. Given a system graph G = (V,E) and a set of principals P , a
policy graph Gρ is a directed acyclic graph with a unique root (of in-degree 0)
such that each vertex is a principal-matching rule (φ, ψ, p). The set of principals
includes a special principal called the null principal and the principal-matching
rule for the root is defined to be (all, none, null).
The edges of the policy graph determine which rules trigger other rules. The
concept of the principal-matching rule’s target is extended to support rules in
which the targets (positive, φ, and negative, ψ) may identify sets of principals
which must exist (or not) in the current set of matched principals or, as pre-
viously, paths of relationships which must exist (or not) in the system graph.
More formally, we evaluate a policy graph with respect to a request, in order to
compute a set of matched principals, as per Algorithm 1 (see Appendix).7
A remote request is initiated in the originating system graph as an originating
remote request (ORR), which is evaluated as per Algorithm 2 (see Appendix).8
Definition 3. Given two distinct system graphs G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E′)
in a bridged system group (G, β), an originating remote request takes the form
G.q = (G.s,G′.v,G′.a),9 where G.s ∈ V , G′.v ∈ V ′ and G′.a ∈ G′.A.
When processing the ORR, the originating system’s PDP must take into
account that the target object is located in a distinct system graph from the
6 Recall that a system graph sequence will document the chain of system graphs
between the originating system graph and the target system graph.
7 Note that we do not add the null principal to the set of matched principals (line 4
of Algorithm 1) so that it does not interfere with authorization decisions, no matter
the conflict resolution strategy employed; and that the algorithm is passed a set of
matched principals to which any it matches are added.
8 In Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 calls to EvaluatePolicyGraph have been simplified,
removing the system graph and policy graph arguments so as to highlight the start
entity, target entity, and set of matched principals arguments.
9 Note that the originating remote request G.q = (G.s,G′.v, G′.a) retains the same
underlying structure as a local request made within the same system graph
G.q = G.(s, v, a).
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subject. Therefore, the ORR is processed by performing compute principals be-
tween the subject and the hub entity which links the originating system graph
to the next graph in the system graph sequence (lines 1, 3 and 4).10 Note that
line 4 passes an empty set to the EvaluatePolicyGraph algorithm (defined in Al-
gorithm 1) as no principals have yet been matched to this remote request. The
result of processing the policy graph is a set of matched principals for traversing
the originating system graph. This is then passed, along with the details of the
request, across the bridging relationship to the next system in the system graph
sequence (lines 5 and 6).11
In non-originating system graphs, the remote request takes the form of an
incoming remote request (IRR), evaluated as per Algorithm 3 (see Appendix);
its processing differs in intermediate and target system graphs. Within an IRR,
the subject component of the ORR is replaced with a tuple identifying the
originating subject, the hub entity through which the request was received by
the current system and the set of matching principals which resulted from the
preceding system’s processing of the request.
Definition 4. Given a bridged system group (G, β) and a system graph sequence
(G1, . . . , Gi−1, Gi, . . . , Gℓ), an incoming remote request processed by system
graph Gi = (Vi, Ei) takes the form Gi.q = ((G1.s,Gi.h,Gi−1.JρK), Gℓ.v,Gℓ.a),
where Gi.h ∈ Vi is the hub through which the request entered Gi and Gi−1.JρK is
the set of matched principals computed by the preceding system graph.
When processing an IRR in an intermediate system graph, the system’s
PDPmust take into account that neither the subject nor target object are located
in the current system graph. Therefore, the IRR is processed by performing
compute principals between two hub entities: the hub entity Gi.h through which
the request entered the system and the hub entity which links the intermediate
system graph to the next graph in the system graph sequence (lines 4 and 5).
The set of matched principals from the preceding system graphs is input into the
graph policy evaluation (line 5) and may result in additional principals being
activated (and added to it), as discussed in Section 2. As with processing an
ORR, the cumulative set of matched principals that results is then passed, along
with the details of the request, across the bridging relationship to the next
system in the system graph sequence (lines 6 and 7). This process continues
until it reaches the target system.
When processing an IRR in the target system graph, the policy graph
evaluation is performed between the hub entity through which the request en-
tered the system and the object of the request, note Gi = Gℓ (line 10). Once
again this makes use of the preceding system graph’s set of matched principals.
However, once a local set of matched principals is determined the compute au-
thorizations step is performed. This allows a set of authorization decisions to
10 The function DetermineLeastCostPathToSystemGraph requires the PDP to interrogate
its local hubs and to collate their responses, as described in Section 2.
11 An appropriate mechanism (e.g. digital signatures) must be in place to enable the
receiving system to ensure the authenticity and freshness of such details.
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be determined (line 11). A definitive decision is then determined, with RPPM’s
default decision process and conflict resolution process employed as with local
requests (line 12).
4 Related Work
Whilst our work in respect of ReBAC inter-operation is novel, the inter-operation
of other access control model instances has been considered in previous literature.
In particular, research into the use of RBAC in multi-domain scenarios has led
to several approaches to inter-operation based principally upon role mapping.
Shehab et al. define a distributed secure interoperability protocol in which
users are assigned roles in remote domains based upon cross domain access
agreements [10]. The order in which roles are acquired within each domain they
access is referred to as the user’s access path. These paths are checked to ensure
the principles of autonomy and security [7] are both satisfied. In Inter-RPPM
remote requests, by construction, are unable to target local resources and the
outcome of local request evaluation is unchanged by the additions discussed in
this paper. Therefore, both of these principles are satisfied trivially.
Shafiq et al. take this further by introducing a policy composition framework
that integrates the RBAC policies of initially distinct domains [9]. They, addi-
tionally, implement a conflict resolution technique to deal with conflicts which
may arise from the differences in how each domain models or references its access
control policies. Within Inter-RPPM we have intentionally avoided integrating
the policies of component model instances, and instead have provided a frame-
work through which those policies may be applied to remote requests.12 This
places a greater requirement upon the manual definition of appropriate policies
within each component model instance; however, it ensures a consistent policy
language.
5 Conclusion
We have defined an inter-operation framework through which multiple RPPM
system graphs may be connected and remote authorization requests may be
evaluated. The connecting of systems is commonplace; however, the ability to
decompose large systems into inter-connected smaller systems is a significant
contribution of this paper and of particular importance in the application of Re-
BAC models. Decomposition enables a trade-off to be made between the compu-
tational complexity of a ReBAC model against the number of model instances
which are employed to control authorizations within a large system.
The inter-connection of ReBAC (system) graphs through directed bridging
relationships, and the use of system graph sequences and the path-vector routing
protocol to identify paths between those graphs is applicable to remote request
12 That being said we support the use of remote principals where desired to provide
for more robust policies.
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evaluation, no matter the model. This paper introduces its formal application in
RPPM, although it is equally applicable to our more recent model, ARPPM [5]
(something we leave for future work).13 In cases where principal abstraction is
not available, however, an alternative means of allowing each component graph’s
evaluation to contribute must be developed. We leave the development of such
mechanisms to future work, only noting that an end-to-end path approach will
produce a super-graph and thus, potentially, be limited by the increase in com-
putational complexity associated with an increase in the number of nodes.
References
1. Carminati, B., Ferrari, E., Perego, A.: Enforcing access control in web-based social
networks. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 13(1) (2009)
2. Cheng, Y., Park, J., Sandhu, R.S.: A user-to-user relationship-based access control
model for online social networks. In: Cuppens-Boulahia, N., Cuppens, F., Garc´ıa-
Alfaro, J. (eds.) DBSec. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7371, pp. 8–24.
Springer (2012)
3. Crampton, J., Sellwood, J.: Path conditions and principal matching: a new ap-
proach to access control. In: Osborn, S.L., Tripunitara, M.V., Molloy, I. (eds.)
19th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, SACMAT
’14, London, ON, Canada - June 25 - 27, 2014. pp. 187–198. ACM (2014),
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2613087.2613094
4. Crampton, J., Sellwood, J.: Relationships, paths and principal matching: a new
approach to access control. CoRR abs/1505.07945 (2015)
5. Crampton, J., Sellwood, J.: ARPPM: administration in the RPPM model. In:
Bertino, E., Sandhu, R., Pretschner, A. (eds.) Proceedings of the Sixth ACM on
Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, CODASPY 2016, New
Orleans, LA, USA, March 9-11, 2016. pp. 219–230. ACM (2016), http://doi.acm.
org/10.1145/2857705.2857711
6. Fong, P.W.L.: Relationship-based access control: protection model and policy lan-
guage. In: Sandhu, R.S., Bertino, E. (eds.) CODASPY. pp. 191–202. ACM (2011)
7. Gong, L., Qian, X.: Computational issues in secure interoperation. IEEE Trans.
Software Eng. 22(1), 43–52 (1996), http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/32.481533
8. Rizvi, S.Z.R., Fong, P.W.L., Crampton, J., Sellwood, J.: Relationship-based access
control for an open-source medical records system. In: Weippl, E.R., Kerschbaum,
F., Lee, A.J. (eds.) Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Access Control
Models and Technologies, Vienna, Austria, June 1-3, 2015. pp. 113–124. ACM
(2015), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2752952.2752962
9. Shafiq, B., Joshi, J., Bertino, E., Ghafoor, A.: Secure interoperation in a mul-
tidomain environment employing RBAC policies. IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng.
17(11), 1557–1577 (2005), http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TKDE.2005.185
10. Shehab, M., Bertino, E., Ghafoor, A.: SERAT: secure role mapping technique for
decentralized secure interoperability. In: Ferrari, E., Ahn, G. (eds.) SACMAT 2005,
10th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, Stockholm,
Sweden, June 1-3, 2005, Proceedings. pp. 159–167. ACM (2005), http://doi.acm.
org/10.1145/1063979.1064007
13 We believe that administrative requests will always be local to a model instance
(maintaining system autonomy) and so only operational requests (equivalent to the
requests discussed in this paper) may be conducted remotely.
Inter-ReBAC: Inter-operation of ReBAC Model Instances 9
Appendix: Algorithms
The pseudocode for the algorithms used to support inter-connection of RPPM
instances is shown below.
Algorithm 1 EvaluatePolicyGraph (ordered compute principals)
Require: System graph G = (V,E), start node u ∈ V , target node v ∈ V , policy graph
Gρ = (Vρ, Eρ), and set of matched principals JρK
Ensure: Returns set of matched principals JρK
1: while Perform breadth-first search of Gρ starting at root vertex do
2: Evaluate current vertex, (φ, ψ, p) ∈ Vρ
3: if G, u, v |= φ and G, u, v 6|= ψ then
4: if p 6= null then
5: JρK ← JρK ∪ p
6: end if
7: else




Require: System graph G = (V,E), ORR G.q = (G.s,G′.v, G′.a), policy graph G.Gρ = G.(Vρ, Eρ)
Ensure: Malformed ORR rejected or set of matched principals G.JρK sent to next system graph in
system graph sequence
1: LCPG,G′ ← DetermineLeastCostPathToSystemGraph(G
′)
2: if G′ reachable then
3: G.h← IdentifyLocalHubForLCP(LCPG,G′ )
4: G.JρK ← EvaluatePolicyGraph(G.s,G.h, ∅)
5: G′′.h← IdentifyNeighbourHubForLCP(LCPG,G′ )
6: Securely send G.q and G.JρK to G′′.h via G.h
7: else
8: Reject malformed ORR
9: end if
Algorithm 3 ProcessIRR
Require: System graph Gi = (Vi, Ei), IRR Gi.q = ((G1.s, Gi.h,Gi−1.JρK), Gℓ.v, Gℓ.a), policy
graph Gi.Gρ = Gi.(Vρ, Eρ)
Ensure: Set of matched principals Gi.JρK sent to next graph in system graph sequence (intermediate
system graph) or authorization decision made (target system graph)
1: if Gi 6= Gℓ then
2: // intermediate system graph
3: LCPGi,Gℓ ← DetermineLeastCostPathToSystemGraph(Gℓ)
4: Gi.h′ ← IdentifyLocalHubForLCP(LCPGi,Gℓ )
5: Gi.JρK ← EvaluatePolicyGraph(Gi.h, Gi.h′, Gi−1.JρK)
6: Gi+1.h← IdentifyNeighbourHubForLCP(LCPGi,Gℓ )
7: Securely send Gi.q and Gi.JρK to Gi+1.h via Gi.h′
8: else
9: // target system graph
10: Gi.JρK ← EvaluatePolicyGraph(Gi.h,Gℓ.v, Gi−1.JρK)
11: Gi.J̺K ← ComputeAuthorizations(Gi.JρK)
12: DecideAuthorizationResult(Gi.JρK, Gi.J̺K)
13: end if
